

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6287

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S E C R E T IAEA VIENNA 7191

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, TECH, PARM, IN, US, IAEA

SUBJECT: INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY

REF: STATE 194505

1. RE PARA 4 REFTTEL, IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT IAEA
DG MADE STATEMENT AT FEBRUARY 1975 BOARD OF GOVERNORS
MEETING IN WHICH HE REFERRED TO STANDARD UNDERTAKING ACCEPTED
BY GOVERNMENTS IN CONCLUDING SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS WITH
IAEA, TO EFFECT THAT THEY WOULD NOT RPT NOT USE SAFE-
GUARDED ITEMS "IN SUCH A WAY AS TO FURTHER MILITARY
PURPOSES," AND THAT AN INVARIABLE AND CARDINAL OBLIGATION
INVOLVED IN THAT UNDERTAKING WAS THAT NUCLEAR MATERIALS
SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE USED FOR DEVELOPMENT, MANUFACTURE
OR TESTING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES OF ANY KIND.
DG ALSO STATED THAT AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS HAD FROM
OUTSET BEEN INTENDED TO ENSURE, AS FAR AS IT WAS IN
POWER OF AGENCY TO DO SO, THAT "SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR
MATERIALS WERE NOT USED FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS OR ANY
OTHER MILITARY PURPOSE." FINALLY, DG NOTED THAT,
SINCE IN MANY CASES MEMBER STATES DESIRED TO SPELL
OUT MORE EXPLICITLY THIS INTENTION THROUGH EXCHANGES
OF NOTES OR LETTERS IN CONNECTION WITH AGENCY SAFE-

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GUARDS AGREEMENTS, SECRETARIAT INTENDED HENCEFORTH TO

INCLUDE SUCH EXPLICIT PROVISION IN SUCH AGREEMENTS THEMSELVES.

2. IT SHOULD ALSO BE RECALLED THAT IAEA/SWISS SAFE-GUARDS AGREEMENT PURSUANT INFCIRC/66 REV. 2 WAS CONSIDERED AT JUNE 1975 BOARD OF GOVERNORS WHICH, IN FACT, DID CONTAIN, FOR FIRST TIME IN SUCH AGREEMENT, EXPLICIT PROVISION EXCLUDING USE OF SAFEGUARDED MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE IN UNDERTAKING. AT THAT TIME INDIAN GOV, WHILE NOT RPT NOT OBJECTING TO AGREEMENT AS SUCH, MADE STATEMENT WHICH CAME VERY CLOSE TO CHALLENGING DG'S STATEMENT IN FEBRUARY MENTIONED ABOVE. (SEE PARA 8 IAEA VIENNA 5124 (NOTAL); SAME STATEMENT ALSO REPORTED PARA 2 IAEA VIENNA 5516 (NOTAL)).

3. IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING, BELIEVE ANALYSIS PARA 4 REFTEL WOULD HAVE TO BE MODIFIED. FURTHER, WE NOTE RECENTLY REPORTED PROPOSAL FOR POSSIBLE EXPORT BY INDIA OF RESEARCH REACTOR TO BANGLADESH (SEE STATE 194810), WHICH IS NOT RPT NOT NPT PARTY. IF SUCH EXPORT EVENTUALLY TAKES PLACE, IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE WHETHER IAEA SAFEGUARDS WILL BE REQUIRED BY INDIA. IF THAT IS CASE, IAEA BOARD WOULD BE CERTAIN TO REQUIRE EXPLICIT UNDERTAKING IN SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT PROHIBITING USE OF SAFEGUARDED MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

4. RE PARA 6 REFTEL, MISSION HAS OBTAINED FURTHER EXPLANATION FROM WALIGURA, AGENCY INSPECTORATE, WHO HAD DISCUSSED SITUATION DURING RECENT VISIT TO INDIA. AGENCY'S PLANS FOR SAFEGUARDING TARAPUR REPROCESSING PLANT PRESENTLY INCLUDE USE OF MINOR ISOTOPE TECHNIQUE AS PRIMARY MEASURE. AGENCY HOPED TO SUPPLEMENT WITH INSTRUMENTS FOR MONITORING HULLS AND VOLUME OF ACCOUNTABILITY VESSEL, BUT BY TIME INDIANS AGREED, ON CONDITION INSTALLATION NOT RPT NOT DELAY PLANT STARTUP, CONSTRUCTION THOSE PARTS OF PLANT HAD REACHED STAGE WHERE THEIR REQUIRED MODIFICATION TO ACCOMMODATE INSTRUMENTATION WOULD CLEARLY HAVE DELAYED STARTUP. THIS CONCLUSION HAD BEEN REACHED DURING WALIGURA'S RECENT VISIT. WALIGURA STATES THAT HE THEN TOLD INDIANS AGENCY WOULD GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO OTHER POSSIBLE SUPPLEMENTARY MONITORING

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TECHNIQUES. PURPOSE OF THIS WAS TO KEEP OPEN SUCH POSSIBILITIES AS USE OF TRACK-ETCH BUTTONS (SEE IAEA VIENNA 6852) TO IDENTIFY FUEL ASSEMBLIES IN REPROCESSING PLANT STORAGE POND AND SOME ARRANGEMENT (UNDEFINED AS YET) WHEREBY HULLS MIGHT BE MONITORED ON WAY TO DISPOSAL. THUS, WHILE AGENCY WAS FORCED BY CONDITION LAID DOWN BY INDIANS TO GIVE UP ON PREFERRED SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUMENT INSTALLATION, THEY BELIEVE DOOR WAS LEFT OPEN FOR PROPOSING OTHER SUPPLEMENTARY

MEASURES TO INDIANS, WHEN AGENCY'S TECHNICAL STUDIES ARE COMPLETED.

5. INDIAN AMB MEHTA HAS JUST RETURNED FROM TRIP TO INDIA, PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF WHICH WAS TO TOUR ATOMIC ENERGY INSTALLATIONS AT SETHNA'S INVITATION. HE INFORMED ME THAT HE PERSUADED SETHNA TO ATTEND IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH SETHNA WAS ORIGINALLY RELUCTANT TO TAKE TIME FROM HIS REGULAR DUTIES.

6. MISSION WILL SUGGEST TO IAEA INSPECTOR GENERAL ROMETSCH THAT HE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SETHNA VISIT TO DISCUSS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, STATUS OF AGENCY'S PLANS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY MEASURES FOR TARAPUR REPROCESSING PLANT.

7. MEHTA CONTRASTED SETHNA'S DISTASTE FOR TRAVEL WITH HIS PREDECESSORS, WHO WERE FREQUENTLY AWAY FROM THEIR OFFICES. HE SAID PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT HE USED WAS THAT SETHNA MUST MEET MEMBERS NEW USG ATOMIC ENERGY TEAM. HE THEREFORE HOPED THAT SETHNA WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY DO SO. I MENTIONED THAT DR. SEAMANS AND OTHER SENIOR ERDA MEMBERS OF DELEGATION WOULD BE ABLE TO BE IN VIENNA ONLY SHORT TIME, BUT I HOPED OPPORTUNITY WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR SETHNA TO MEET WITH THEM. COMMENT: THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SCHEDULING DELEGATIONS'S APPOINTMENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE FOR DR. SEAMANS.LABOWITZ

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